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IN THE SUPREME COU2T OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
---oooOooo---
SANDRA D. FUNK and 
ROBERT A. YOUlJG, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, Supreme Court No. 15,937 
vs. 
WILLIAN R. YOUNG, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
---oooOooo---
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
---oooOooo---
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for judicial sale of real property 
located in Salt Lake County, under the partition statute or 
equity jurisdiction, and for a division of the proceeds, with 
provision made for the life tenant, who has joined with a 
remainderman as plaintiffs. 
DISPOSITION Ill THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court dismissed the complaint on defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief may be granted. 
'l'HL !'1\Tl!RL 0F REL,IEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs-Respondents request this court to reverse 
Lilce tr LJl court cltll1 to tyc'rnti t tlle matter to proceed. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
There being no transcript or evidence taken, and 
the matter having been detcrmineu from a reviev1 of the 
verified complaint, the statement of facts consists of a 
review of the verified complaint and the Decree recited 
therein previously entered in Probate No. 56044, Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, in the f~tter of the 
Estate of Stella J. Young, Deceased. The facts are set 
forth in numbered paragraphs to aid in reference. 
1. In a probate decree for the Estate of Stella 
J. Young, dece2se~. ~er ·nilJren, plaintiff Sandra D. Funk 
and defenuanc_ ,. .·:·,_.ng, were granted a remainder 
interest as tenants in common of a home located in Salt Lake 
City. The decree also provided that plaintiff Robert A. 
Young was to have a life estate in the home, subject to 
his personally residing at the home, and to his repair and 
maintenance of the premises and his paying the utilities, 
taxes, and special assessments. 
2. The parties are adults, and except for the 
life estate in the home, pl;cunti ff Robert A. Young, a 
spendthrift, received nothinJ more from the estate, the 
balance being divided cquall~ to plaintiff Sand~a D. Funk 
and defendant \lillio.m H. Youree;. 
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3. In order to utilize the home, plaintiff Sandra 
D. Funk has expended some $5,000 on permanent improvements, 
and to assist her brother Robert, she has paid the expenses 
for maintaining the home. However, she does not have the 
necessary funds to bring the home up to reasonable insulRtion 
standards to reduce the rising utility costs to utilize the 
home. 
4. The value of the property at the time of the 
probate was listed in the appraisal in July, 1971, as 
$7,500. The valueof the property at the time of the filing 
of the complaint was $40,000, net proceeds from the sale 
of the same, based upon an offer to purchase received in 
c.Jovember, 1977, including the improvements made by Sandra 
D. Funk, and acquiesed in by defendant William R. Young. 
5. There are no liens or obligations against the 
property. 
6. Plaintiff Sandra D. Funk desires to sell the 
home and purchase a more suitable residence for plaintiff 
Robert A. Young, in which he would receive a life estate 
similar to that he currently enjoys from his mother's estate. 
Defendant William R. Young has refused to cooperate in the 
sale of the home and to accept an adjusted payment for his 
vested remainder interest. 
7. Slncc the property consists of a house and a 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
- 4 -
lot, partition of the property, taking into account the life 
estate, would not be possible. 
8. The prayer for relief sought an order of the 
Court for sale of the property through a referee, and for 
an apportionment of the proceeds, taking into account the 
improvements paid for by plaintiff Sandra o. Funk, and 
taking into account the remaining value of the life estate, 
and with payment of the adjusted portions to defendant 
and plaintiff Sandra D. Funk, with the restriction on the 
plaintiff's proceeds that the same be used to purchase a 
suitable habitation for the plaintiff Robert A. Young, 
which contains a life estate as provided in the original 
probate decree. 
ARGUI-'lENT 
POINT I. PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT STATES A CAUSE 
OF ACTION UNDER THE UTAH PARTITION STATUTE. 
The Utah partition statute provides as follows: 
78-39-l. When several cotenants hold and 
are in possession of real property as joint 
tenants or tenants in co~non, in which one or 
more of them have an estate of inheritance, 
or for life or lives, or for years, an action 
may be brought by one or more of such persons 
for a partition thereof according to the 
respective rights of the persons interested 
therein, and for a sale of such property or a 
part thereof, if it appears that a partition 
cannot be made without gr-eat lJrejudicc to the 
O\n,crs. 
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The parties to this action arc the sole owners of the 
property. The life tenant, subject to defeasance for 
failure to meet conditions of paying taxes, residing in 
the home, maintaining and repairing the same, and paying 
any assessments, during his tenancy, meets the requirements 
of the statute. The two remaindermen are vested and shall 
receive the property upon failure of the life estate, 
lllcnce they meet the requirements of the statute. 
The trial court indicated that the difficulty 
vJith the plaintiffs' position is that the remaindermen are 
not in possession, and thus may not maintain any cause 
under the partition statute. 
This Court has not specifically defined the meaning 
of the words "in possession 11 • However, it has ruled, in 
Larsen v. Daynes, 102 Utah 312, 133 P.2d 785 (1943), 
_reversi_223. 102 Utah 305, 122 P.2d 429 (1942), that: 
The court has power to partition, sell or 
settle the respective property rights of persons 
interested in real property. Sec. 104-58-1 
ct seq., R. s. u. 1933. [Sec. 104-58-1, R.S.U. 1933, 
is identical with present partition section 
78-39-1, cited above.] 
_f__::l., at. 3Li. 
In the Larsen case the Court overruled a demurrer 
(motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim) to a complaint 
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requesting partition or sale of the plaintiff's propert~ 
because he could not transfer the same as it was 
encumbered by a contingent interest in plaintiff's clivDrced 
spouse of l/3 of the plaintiff's property if she survived 
him. 
In the instant case, the plaintiff Robert A. 
Young, has a possessory estate, a life estate, and is 
in fact in possession. The estates of Sandra D. Funk 
and William R. Young are estates of inheritance, are 
vested, are alienable, and enjoyment is merely postpone0 
until the death of William R. Young, or sooner if he 
fails to meet: .... 1t:· -= ~r-~-=r contingencies. These remainder 
cc~,~otes permitted at corrunon la•tJ as 
remainder interests until the Statute of Uses permitted 
executory interests, such as the contingent remainder 
terminated in the Larsen case. 
The lanquage of the partition statute provides 
for partition, inter alia, where joint tenants, ln posses-
sion, in which one or more oF them have an estate of inheri-
tance, huve the property interest. I!O'i·iever., at common ln.~,,, 
joint tenancy is not an "estate of inheritance". Sec 
Babbitt v. Day, 5 A. 275, 276, 41 ~l.J.Eq., 14 StcvJ. <92. 
On the other hand, a vested remainder after a life 
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estate is an "estate of inheritance." See Brown v. Fidelity 
Union Trust Co., 9 A.2d 311, 327, 126 N.J.Eq. 406 (1939); and 
Bunting v. Spcek, 21 P. 288, 290, 41 Kan. 424, 3 L.R.A. 690 (1889), 
citing Smith v. West, 103 Ill. 332. Thus it would appear 
that the statute is at best ambiguous. 
The one argument which would be most pursuasive 
against allowing this partition suit to proceed would be 
if the remaindermen attempted to defeat the life estate 
of the life tenant in possession. However, in the instant 
case, the life tenant in possession has joined as plaintiff 
to effect sale and distribution of the property, thus 
avoiding the argument that a possessory interest has 
oeen impro~erly disturbed. See, ~~·, Ripp v. Ripp, 
314 N.Y.S.2d 461, 463, 64 t1isc.2d 323 (1970), wherein the court 
denied partition to an out of possession remainderman 
ex-husbc:md who attempted to defeat the possession of the 
life tenant former spouse. However, in the Larsen case, 
lh1s Court permitted such partition or sale where 
initiatccd by thee estate holder in possession. 
POINT II. EQUITY PEHMITS PARTITION OR SALE 
IF THERE IS NO LEGAL REMEDY. 
In the event this Court is constrained to hold 
l_hc~t the Uta!' statute on partition does not allmv for 
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the relief sought in plaintiffs' complaint, the chancery 
courts would have allowed such relief, and under its 
equity jurisdiction, the lower court could have provided 
the relief prayed for in the complaint. 
In the concurring opinions to the Larsen case 
it was stated as follows: 
I think our statute on partition was not 
intended t.o so circumscribe or restrict the 
remedy that relief cannot be granted under the 
facts pleaded in this case. See 47 C.J. 338, 
§ 171, and cases there cited. Why should we 
hold that one who owns and is in possession 
of a two-thirds interest in property in fee 
cannot apply to the courts to partition the 
property as against one ~ill holds a contingent 
remai"ier in the other one-third interest? I 
':l-:ic: the chancery courts would have granted 
-~~.t1cn in such cases and that our statute 
:,jt i;-~Ucndcd to diminish or restrict the 
rigLt as recognized by the chancery courts. 
The use and improvement of real estate is too 
vital to the public welfare to be hampered by 
rules or restrictions which have no foundation 
in justice or sound public policy. 
Id., at 317, Boyt, D.,T., concurring. 
In addition to the equitable considerations, this 
situation was created through a IVill and an order of the 
probate division of court. It lvould be reasonable for 
the court to continue supervision overfue property left 
to a spendthrift, and to retain jurisdiction for t 11at 
purpose. The unreasonable refusal of a remaindermar, joint 
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heir to release his interest for a fair payment in order 
to facilitate justice, should be sufficient grounds to 
permit the court to exercise its jurisdiction. 
CONCLUSION 
The complaint herein states a cause of action 
under several different t~eories. One avenue for relief 
in this matter for the plaintiff Sandra D. Funk, is to 
persuade her brother, plaintiff Robert A. Young, to 
move out of the house, thus terminating the life estate 
from failure of a condition. At that point, she could 
then commence an action because she would be a tenant 
in common with her brcther, defendant lhlliam R. Young. 
This would leave plaintiff Robert A. Young without a 
fair remedy and would disinherit him from his mother's 
estate. It cannot be that the courts must insist that 
he risk his sister's good graces to provide for him and 
abandon his inheritance because the courts would not 
respond to his plea. 
DATED this lst c'ay of September, 1978. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants 
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